The Volatility Implications of the Chinese Cryptocurrency Ban by Manwaring, Keaton
Utah State University 
DigitalCommons@USU 
All Graduate Plan B and other Reports Graduate Studies 
12-2021 
The Volatility Implications of the Chinese Cryptocurrency Ban 
Keaton Manwaring 
Utah State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports 
 Part of the Business Analytics Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Manwaring, Keaton, "The Volatility Implications of the Chinese Cryptocurrency Ban" (2021). All Graduate 
Plan B and other Reports. 1591. 
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports/1591 
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Graduate Studies at DigitalCommons@USU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in All Graduate Plan B and 
other Reports by an authorized administrator of 














In this paper, I examine the effect of the May 18th, 2021 Chinese ban of cryptocurrency transactions 
on the overall volatility of the cryptocurrency market. To do this, I analyze, in both univariate and 
multivariate settings, range-based volatility in various event windows surrounding the event. I find 
clear economic and statistical change in volatility in the five days after the ban. In the ten-day 
period after the ban, there is a moderate economic change in volatility. In the forty-day period after 
the ban, there is little economic change in volatility. I conclude that the Chinese ban had a clear 






 Cryptocurrencies (hereafter cryptos) have been in the news a lot lately as policy makers 
continue to debate their viability as a currency or if they are simply speculative investment 
vehicles. Although cryptos have been mostly used as investment vehicles (Hileman 2017), it is 
important to identify the value they might have over other more traditional currencies. Cryptos 
have a few advantages. First, the new technology that Bitcoin introduced in the blockchain. The 
blockchain is a series of ledgers that creates a system to keep track of payments using a “proof of 
work” method to broadcast the correct ledger. This creates the advantage of the ledger being 
decentralized, which means the holder of the crypto can mitigate the risk of destabilization in a 
country like you would with a regular currency. Second, cryptos have the ability to have an 
anonymous ledger, so that the holder can remain anonymous, which can be a real power in today’s 
limited privacy environment. Lastly, there is a surge of advancements in the crypto field happening 
today. For example, Ethereum has developed a programming language that you can build apps on 
their platform and use Ether as the primary currency on the applications. This is just one example 
of progress that is taking the blockchain technology and providing further innovations. Perhaps 
this is why there are so many people interested in cryptos and why they get so much attention in 
the news.  
However, this attention ends up being a double edge sword, with high profile figures, like 
Elon Musk, being able to affect the price of different cryptos just by sending out a tweet or a news 
release. A recent study built a supervised model to test cryptocurrency pricing using news and 
social media sentiment, which was able to correctly predict the biggest price fluctuations over a 
67-day time period (Lamon, Nielsen, Redondo 2017). This correlation between news, social media 
and price – as well as the cryptos’ speculative nature – creates a situation that makes cryptos a 
 
 
risky investment with extreme fluctuations that can create price instability. Therefore, big news 
events involving cryptos can be of intrigue for any investor, or holder, of the cryptocurrency.  
The increase in news, size, and intrigue around cryptos has also caught the attention of 
world governments. Although China has been the biggest country in mining and trading cryptos 
(Hileman 2017), the country has also been the most stringent in terms of regulation. For instance, 
China recently banned public coin offerings (Zhang 2020). In addition, on May 18, 2021 China 
took an even further step in announcing the ban of cryptocurrency transactions altogether. While 
many can speculate on the reasons for the Chinese government to ban cryptocurrencies, the 
purpose of this paper is to look into the effects this ban had on the volatility of the overall crypto 
market. To measure volatility, I follow Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002) and estimate a range-
based measure of volatility, which has been shown to properly capture important properties of 
stochastic volatility. In particular, I calculate range volatility by taking the difference between the 
natural log of the daily high price minus the natural log of the daily low price (Alizadeh, Brandt, 
and Diebold 2002). I then examine this measure of volatility before and after the Chinese ban in 
an attempt to extrapolate whether this ban had any effect on the market as a whole.  
To carry out this event study, I examine the prices (in USD) of 372 different 
cryptocurrencies, the corresponding volume in the number of coins traded, and the measure of 
volatility, discussed earlier. I also control for illiquidity, which is calculated using absolute 
continuously compounded return divided by daily dollar volume (Amihud 2002). I examine 
volatility around three different event windows: five days, ten days, and forty days before and after 
the ban of cryptocurrency transactions in China. This way I can test for the short-, medium-, and 
long-term effects of the news of the ban. I also estimate multivariate regressions that control for a 
number of important factors that might explain changes in volatility. I also provide a graphical 
 
 
analysis of volatility during the event days so I can observe an overall trend in order to can infer 
any information about the long-term effects of the event.  
 Results show that for all three event windows, volatility statistically increases. There is 
clearly a short-term economic effect from the event as the average five-day post-event volatility is 
0.1685 more than the average five-day pre-event volatility. However, the long-term economic 
effect is questionable, as the 40-day post-event volatility is .0143 more than the 40-day pre-event 
volatility. While the post-minus-pre-period difference is still statistically significant in the longer 
window at the .01 significance level, there really does not appear to be much of an economic 
increase. When focusing on the multivariate analysis, I observe similar findings as the short-term 
economic effect of the event is statistically and economically significant, but the longer-term effect 
on overall volatility is too small to draw meaningful conclusions. The results from my analysis 
suggests that a country-wide ban on cryptocurrency transactions, like the one in China, has a 
dramatic, short-term effect on volatility. This information has practical importance to those using 
cryptos as an investment vehicle, or store of value, and to those using cryptos as a currency in a 
more traditional sense. 
 The rest of the paper follows. Section 2 presents a discussion of the data used throughout 
the analysis. Section 3 reports the empirical tests and results. Section 4 offers some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Data Description 
 The data used in the analysis come from 372 different cryptocurrencies during an 80-day 
period (40 days before and 40 days after) surrounding the Chinese ban of crypto transactions on 
May 18th, 2021. I obtain daily pricing and volume data from the largest cryptos, like Bitcoin, as 
 
 
well as smaller coins in order to capture a broad crypto market trend. The data is obtained from 
CoinMarketCap. The daily price variable is the exchange rate between each coin and USD. 
Volume is the number of coins traded per day. Rvolt is a ranged based volatility, or the natural log 
of the daily high price minus the natural log of the daily low price following Alizadeh, Brandt, and 
Diebold (2002). Illiq is the absolute continuously compounded return divided by daily dollar 
volume following Amihud (2002). After obtaining this information, I clean the data by dropping 
any missing data cells and winsorizing at the 1st and 99th percentile levels. I note that winsorizing 
the data forces the maximum values, such as price, to be to be lower than expected. My final 
sample consists of 29,016 crypto-day observations.  
 In table 1, we report the summary statistics of the sample. The average price is $69.42 and 
the standard deviation is $410.46. The minimum price is $0.00, the maximum $3,587.51 and the 
median is $0.52. The price variable is highly right skewed as the median is lower than the mean, 
meaning that most of the cryptos exchange at a low price and there are some high outliers including 
the maximum, like Bitcoin. For this reason, I take the natural log of this variable in my 
multivariable regression analysis. The average of dollar volume is $438,318,185 and the standard 
deviation is $1,862,961,214. The minimum volume is $32, the maximum is $14,310,000,000, and 
the median is $3,184,751. Again, the volume is right skewed because most coins have little trade 
volume and there are the bigger coins have massive trade volume amounts. Again, I take the natural 
log of this variable in my multivariable regression analysis to account for this type of skewness. 
Rvolt has a mean of 0.1685 and a standard deviation of 0.1390. The minimum Rvolt is 0.0018, the 
maximum is 0.9086 and the median is 0.1313. This variable is pretty close to normally distributed 
and no adjustments need to be made. The Illiq variables mean is 0.4417, while the standard 
deviation 2.9596. The minimum volume is 0.0000, the max is 30.2439 and the median is 0.0001. 
 
 
This variable is also right skewed, but since there are days with zero illiquidity (the absolute value 
of the daily return in the numerator is zero), we are unable to take the natural log of this variable.  
 
3. Empirical Results  
3.1. Correlation Matrix 
 To begin the analysis, I first look at a simple pooled correlation matrix of all the variables 
used in the study. Table 2 reports the pooled Pearson correlation coefficients between price, 
volume, volatility, and illiquidity. Price and Volume have a correlation coefficient of 0.3728, 
which is statistically significant. I expected price and volume to have a positive correlation because 
the lower priced coins are usually the less popular coins. Price and Rvolt have a correlation 
coefficient of -0.0674, which is also statistically significant. This is expected because as volatility 
increases, I expect that to have a negative impact on the price variable. Price and Illiq have a 
correlation coefficient of -0.0247 and is statistically significant. The likely reason they have a 
negative correlation coefficient is because an illiquid currency has a negative effect on price 
because of its’ inefficiencies in trading. Volume and Rvolt have a correlation coefficient of -0.0374, 
which is statistically significant. I expect this negative correlation given that the more stable 
currencies usually trade more often. Volume and Illiq have a correlation coefficient of 0.2508 and 
is statistically significant. This is expected because more volume would suggest that the crypto is 
less illiquid. This unexpected result might be caused by the relationship between dollar volume 
and price. Rvolt and Illiq has a correlation coefficient of 0.2508 and is statistically significant. This 
is likely due to fact that the more volatile the coin, the less liquidity in the crypto.  
3.2. Univariate Tests 
 
 
 To dig deeper into the variable of interest, Rvolt, I conduct a univariate analysis around 
three different time windows surrounding May 18, 2021 – the Chinese ban date. The results of this 
analysis are in Table 3. Here, I estimate the means and medians of crypto volatility during the 
periods before and after the event. I then examine the difference of the means and medians using 
t-statistics and Wilcoxon sum rank tests. The first event window consists of the five days before 
and after the ban. The difference in mean volatility during the pre- and post-event periods is 
0.1685, which is statistically significant at the .01 level and has a t-statistic of 31.63. The difference 
in median during this same timeframe is 0.1759 and is also statistically significant at the .01 level. 
The implications of this result are clear. There seems to be a large short-term effect of the Chinese 
ban on the volatility of cryptocurrencies. In economic terms, these results suggest that volatility 
approximately doubled in response to the ban.  
The question then shifts to whether or not the ban has a lasting impact on the volatility of 
cryptos. To test this possibility, I replicate my tests using the ten days before and after the event. 
The difference in means during this period is 0.0849, and the difference in medians is 0.0634. 
Again, the test statistics suggest that the differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
The results are muted quite a bit when adding only an extra five days to the event window. 
However, there is still an economic effect, and in a medium length time window, I can still say 
that the ban of crypto transactions in China had an effect on volatility on the crypto market as a 
whole. When looking at the 40 days before and after the ban, the difference in means for this event 
window is 0.0143, and the difference in the medians is 0.0038. These are also statistically 
significant at the .01 level. Although the 40-day time range has statistical significance it has 
severely less economic significance. What I can conclude from these univariate tests is that 
 
 
volatility increased dramatically during the time of the ban, but leveled out quickly after the event 
and went back to previous volatility levels.  
I provide graphical representation of volatility surrounding the ban in Figure 1. The results 
from this simple analysis confirm what I have learned through the univariate tests discussed 
previously. This graph shows a huge spike in volatility on the day of the announcement. After the 
event, volatility stays unusually high for a few days then appears mean revert. In the second panel 
of Figure 1, I plot the price on the y-axis and event days on the x-axis. Price drops on the day of 
the event and appears to continue to decrease for the rest of the time period. 
3.3. Multivariate Tests 
 To better understand the effect of the ban on crypto volatility, I conduct a multivariate 
analysis, which is reported in Table 4. More specifically, I estimate the following regression 
equation on a panel of crypto-day observations:  
𝑅𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑁(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3𝐿𝑁(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 
 
where Rvolt is the measure of range- based volatility. Post is an indicator variable equal to one on 
days after the announcement of the Chinese ban and zero otherwise. We include as control 
variables, the natural log of price and volume as well as Amihud’s (2002) measure of illiquidity. 
We have taken the natural log of the price and volume variables to help normalize the distribution 
of both of these variables. This regression allows me to test whether the event has any effect on 
the volatility of cryptos while controlling for other important factors, such as price, volume, and 
illiquidity. To help with possible heteroskedasticity, I report heteroskedastic robust standard errors. 
I again look at the three different periods surrounding the ban.  
First, I look at the five days before and after the event. The intercept for the regression is 
0.064 with a 7.10 t-statistic and a .10 significance level. Post has a 0.1647 coefficient with a 32.49 
 
 
t-statistic and a .01 significance level. This means that, on average, volatility is 0.1647 greater in 
the five days after the event then before the event. So even when controlling for price, volume and 
illiquidity, the event still effects the volatility of cryptos in the short term. Regarding the control 
variables, the LN(price) variable has a -.0079 coefficient with a corresponding t-statistic of -7.81, 
which is statistically significant at the .01 significance level. This coefficient suggests that if we 
increase price by one percent we expect volatility to decrease by .0079 units. This variable is not 
economically significant and does not give us any real insights. The LN(volume) variable produces 
a coefficient of 0.0052 with a t-statistic of 6.95. This result indicates that an increase in volume by 
one percent increases volatility by 0.0052 units. Like LN(price), this variable is not economically 
significant either and does not provide us with important insights. The Illiq variable has a 0.0084 
coefficient and a 7.93 t-statistic, which suggests that Illiq is statistically significant at the .01 level. 
This result indicates that a one unit increase in illiquidity has a 0.0084 unit increase in volatility. 
The findings for this coefficient is also economically insignificant as well. This model had 3,956 
observations and had an adjusted R-squared as 0.2366 suggesting that the model explains 23.66% 
of the variation in volatility.  
 Next, I examine the ten days before and after the Chinese ban to see if controlling for these 
variables has any differing effect on volatility in the medium term. The intercept coefficient is 
0.1136 and has a t-statistic of 13.44, which is statistically significant at the .01 significance level. 
Again, the Post variable has a coefficient of 0.0819 and a t-statistic of 22.67, which is significant 
at the .01 significance level. This result suggests that the time after the event has a 0.0819 higher 
volatility, on average, when compared to the pre-event period. Again, I find that after controlling 
for price, volume and illiquidity, there is a moderate economic effect on the volatility due to the 
event. I will not review the coefficients of the control variables here as they had no significant 
 
 
change when I examined the different time period. This model had 7,554 observations and an 
adjusted R-squared of 0.1159.  
 Given the univariate analysis – conducted in the previous subsection – I next determine 
whether controlling for price, volume and illiquidity variables had any change in the post-event 
variable in the long-term of forty days before and after the event. The intercept for this model is 
0.1657 and has a t-statistic of 39.86. The Post variable has a coefficient of .0083 and has a t-
statistic of 4.85 and is statistically significant at the .01 significant level. This result indicates that, 
relative to the pre-event window, volatility is .0083 greater after the event, which is not very 
economically significant. I find that as the longer the event window is, the less economically 
significant the Post variable becomes. This confirms what I learned in the univariate analysis as 
the event impacted the volatility in the short term, but as time went on, the volatility returned to 
pre-event levels. The intercept follows the opposite trend as we might predict because all the other 
variables are very similar. The intercept starts to explain the volatility instead of the post variable, 
this simply means that volatility is explained more by a constant as time goes on or another 
explanatory variable we have not included in our model. I note that there are 29,016 observations 
used in this analysis and the adjusted R-squared is 0.0711. The R-squared has also decreased 
significantly which means the model is explaining less when looking longer term.  
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, I examine whether or not the Chinese ban of cryptocurrency transactions 
affected the overall volatility of the crypto market in the short-, medium, and long-term. To do 
this, I use both univariate and multivariate analyses that capture changes in volatility during the 
period immediately surrounding the ban. My findings show that in the five days before and after 
the ban, there is a clear economic and statistical impact on crypto volatility. When I increase the 
 
 
event window to the 10 days before and after the ban, the inferences change slightly. I find that 
there is only a moderate economic change in volatility in the medium term. Finally, to examine 
the longer-term effects of the ban, I explore the 40 days before and after the event. Here, I find that 
the effect on volatility decreases so low that there is little to no economic significance in the long-
term. My conclusion is that while the news of the Chinese government banning crypto affected the 
stability of prices, the ban did not affect the long-term volatility of the marketplace.  
 Perhaps future studies might examine the effect of the ban on overall prices. As I show in 
Figure 1, the average crypto price decreases dramatically after the event and stays at this decreased 
level for at least 40 days. I would say that this requires further attention to see if I can find a causal 
relationship between this event and the price of cryptos when China announced the ban. This type 
of research might provide evidence of a longer-term price effect even though the change in 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
This table displays summary statistics that describe the sample of 372 cryptocurrencies in the 40 days 
prior to May 18, 2021 when China announced it would ban cryptocurrency transactions. We obtain daily 
pricing and volume data from CoinMarketCap. Price is the exchange rate between the cryptocurrency 
and USD. Volume is the number of coins traded in USD. Rvolt is range based volatility of Alizadeh, 
Brandt, and Diebold (2002), or the natural log of the daily high price minus the natural log of the daily 
low price. Illiq is Amihud (2002) illiquidity, or absolute continuously compounded return divided by 
volume (scaled by 104).  
 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
Price $69.42 $410.46 $0.00 $0.52 $3,587.51 
Volume $438,318,185 $1,862,961,214 $32 $3,184,751 $14,310,000,000 
Rvolt 0.1685 0.1390 0.0018 0.1313 0.9086 

































Table 2. Pooled Correlation Matrix 
This table shows the Pearson pooled correlation coefficients between various cryptocurrency measures 
in the 40 days prior to May 18, 2021 when China announced it would ban cryptocurrency transactions. 
Price is the exchange rate between the cryptocurrency and USD. Volume is the number of coins traded 
in USD. Rvolt is range based volatility of Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002), or the natural log of the 
daily high price minus the natural log of the daily low price. Illiq is Amihud (2002) illiquidity, or absolute 
continuously compounded return divided by volume (scaled by 104). P-values are in brackets.  
 
  Price Volume Rvolt Illiq 
Price 1.0000    
     
Volume 0.3728 1.0000   
 [<.0001]    
Rvolt -0.0674 -0.0374 1.0000  
 [<.0001] [<.0001]   
Illiq -0.0247 -0.0351 0.2508 1.0000 































Table 3. Volatility of Cryptocurrencies around Chinese Ban – Univariate Analysis 
This table displays average daily volatility for 372 cryptocurrencies in various event windows 
surrounding May 18, 2021 when China announced it would ban cryptocurrency transactions. Rvolt is 
range based volatility of Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002), or the natural log of the daily high price 
minus the natural log of the daily low price. T-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets. 
*** and ** represent statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.  
 
  [-5, +5] [-10, +10] [-40, +40] 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Pre 0.1721 0.1389 0.1802 0.1465 0.1685 0.1313 
       
Post 0.3406 0.3148 0.2651 0.2100 0.1829 0.1351 
       
Different 0.1685*** 0.1759*** 0.0849*** 0.0634*** 0.0143*** 0.0038*** 

































Table 4. Volatility of Cryptocurrencies around Chinese Ban – Multivariate Analysis 
This table reports the results from estimating the following regression equation on a sample of crypto-
daily observations: 
Rvolti,t=α+1Postt+2LN(Pricei,t)+3LN(Volumei,t)+4Illiqt+i,t 
where the dependent variable is range-based volatility, Rvolt, or the natural log of the daily high price 
minus the natural log of the daily low price. Post is an indicator variable equal to one if the crypto-day 
observation is on or after May 18, 2021 when China announced it would ban cryptocurrency transactions; 
zero otherwise. Price is the exchange rate between the cryptocurrency and USD. Volume is the number 
of coins traded in USD. Illiq is Amihud (2002) illiquidity, or absolute continuously compounded return 
divided by volume (scaled by 104). T-statistics are in parentheses obtained from robust standard errors. 
*** represents statistical significance at the 0.10 level.  
 
  [-5, +5] [-10, +10] [-40, +40] 
Intercept 0.0864*** 0.1136*** 0.1657*** 
 (7.10) (13.44) (39.86) 
Post 0.1647*** 0.0819*** 0.0083*** 
 (32.49) (22.67) (4.85) 
LN(Price) -0.0079*** -0.0077*** -0.0068*** 
 (-7.81) (-10.83) (-20.21) 
LN(Volume) 0.0052*** 0.0039*** -0.0003 
 (6.95) (7.43) (-1.27) 
Illiq 0.0084*** 0.0094*** 0.0080*** 
 (7.93) (10.66) (16.31) 
    
N 3,956 7,554 29,016 






















Figure 1. Volatility and Price of Cryptocurrency Market around Chinese Ban 
This table plots average range-based volatility and prices across the 372 cryptocurrencies in the months 
surrounding May 18, 2021 when China announced it would ban cryptocurrency transactions. Rvolt is 
range based volatility of Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002), or the natural log of the daily high price 
minus the natural log of the daily low price. 
 
  
 
 
